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 1 Introduction
Since their introduction in the late sixties Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) have been
the subject of policy debates and regulation in many countries. A major issue is the welfare
e⁄ect of cash withdrawal fees and the partial incompatibility generated by the discriminatory
nature of some of these fees. In ATM markets, compatibility depends on whether consumers
can use their cards with other banks￿ATM machines. This compatibility can be reduced by
imposing retail fees on ￿foreign￿transactions, i.e. transactions on ATMs that are not owned
by the bank to which the consumer is a¢ liated. Such fees can be levied by the consumer￿ s
own bank (foreign or ￿on-others￿fees) and/or the bank owning the ATM (surcharges), and
may a⁄ect consumer welfare in two opposing ways.1 On the one hand, consumers are harmed
as it is more costly to derive bene￿ts from the rival banks￿ATMs. On the other hand, they
may bene￿t if discriminatory fees cause banks to increase investment in their ATM networks
to gain from increased stand-alone ATM fee revenues as well as strategic interactions with
the deposit market.
This paper empirically examines the e⁄ects of discriminatory fees on ATM investment and
welfare. In addition, we consider the role of coordination in ATM investment between banks.
Although most countries have in common that ATMs of di⁄erent banks have been intercon-
nected or shared relatively quickly after their initial introduction, considerable variation in
countries￿ATM market structures has existed (and still exists). This variation concerns not
only the fee structure of the market, but also the degree of coordination in ATM investment
between banks.2 In particular, by the mid-nineties many European countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Portugal) had a single
shared ATM network that was commonly owned by the banks; ATM investment decisions
were coordinated and there were no or very low retail fees. France also resembled this situa-
tion, although there was no common ownership of the network. In most other countries there
was neither common ownership nor coordination, and foreign fees could be relatively high in
Germany, Italy, Spain and the U.K. Surcharges did not exist, except in the U.K. Until 1996
the evolution in the U.S. was similar to this latter group of countries; there was typically
no common ownership3 and foreign fees were charged already since the eighties. After 1996,
1In addition to these retail fees, foreign ATM transactions involve a wholesale fee as well; the consumer￿ s
bank pays an interchange fee to the bank that owns the ATM in order to cover at least part of the cost
incurred by the latter.
2See the Appendix of Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009) for a more detailed overview for Europe, and
e.g. Ishii (2005) for the U.S.
3Exceptions existed though, see McAndrews and Rob (1996) for an overview, and Carlton and Frankel
(1995) for a discussion of a merged monopoly regional network in Chicago.
1surcharges were introduced and the situation di⁄ered quite dramatically from all European
countries except the U.K.4
As the recent literature on ATMs has largely focused on surcharge introductions in the
U.S., we contribute in a number of ways. From a policy perspective, a ￿rst contribution of the
paper is to consider the e⁄ects of foreign fees in addition to surcharges. Although they are at
least as prevalent as surcharges, foreign fees appear to have received much less attention in
policy debates and the economic literature. Secondly, we analyze how welfare is a⁄ected by
changing the degree of coordination in ATM investment between banks. Finally, we assess
the extent of under- or overinvestment in the presence of discriminatory fees by comparing
market structure and welfare to a situation where a social planner decides on discriminatory
fees and ATM investment to maximize total welfare. In contrast to the existing studies
that ￿nd overinvestment in the presence of discriminatory fees, we explicitly consider the
consumers￿withdrawal behaviour and the importance of ATM locations in this respect. That
is, we provide a thorough analysis of the demand-side of the market in addition to the banks￿
investment decisions, while taking into account the spatial nature of the market. To the
extent that ATM investment has substantial e⁄ects on consumer welfare in the withdrawal
market, our results may shed new light on the discussion of potential overinvestment in
the presence of discriminatory fees. From a more methodological perspective, this paper
is to our knowledge the ￿rst to use actual ATM-level data to assess the determinants of
cash withdrawal demand, in particular the e⁄ect of the location of ATMs on the number of
ATM transactions. Secondly, we recognize the importance of endogenizing ATM investment
when considering the welfare e⁄ect of changing the degree of coordination and pricing in the
market. In particular, we allow for banks to reoptimize their ATM networks when they move
from coordination to a competitive setting and after the introduction of discriminatory fees.
Using a unique data set that consists of ATM-level cash withdrawal demand as well as
branch, ATM and consumer location characteristics we estimate a spatial model of consumer
cash withdrawal demand and ATM investment. The model is estimated in a setting where
banks coordinate ATM investment and retail fees for cash withdrawals are absent. Based
on these model estimates we can make detailed spatial predictions in terms of cash with-
drawals and ATM investment, allowing us to perform counterfactuals to assess the e⁄ects of
changing the degree of coordination in ATM investment between banks and the introduc-
tion of discriminatory withdrawal fees. In particular, we let banks decide on discriminatory
fees (foreign fees and/or surcharges) and ATM investment, while taking into account the
consumers￿reactions in terms of withdrawal behaviour, and compare ATM investment and
4￿On-us￿fees (charged by the customer￿ s bank for cash withdrawals at the own bank) were almost always
zero, both in Europe and the U.S.
2welfare under di⁄erent coordination and pricing regimes.
Our main ￿ndings are that foreign fees and surcharges appear to result in opposite direc-
tions for ATM investment and welfare changes. Foreign fees tend to reduce ATM availability
and (consumer) welfare, whereas surcharges positively a⁄ect ATM availability and the dif-
ferent welfare components when the consumers￿price elasticity is not too large. Second,
an organization of the ATM market that contains some degree of coordination between the
banks may be desirable from a welfare perspective. Finally, ATM availability is always higher
when a social planner decides on discriminatory fees and ATM investment to maximize total
welfare. This implies that there is underinvestment in ATMs, even in the presence of dis-
criminatory fees. As this contrasts the ￿ndings of earlier studies, whether discriminatory fees
result in over- or underinvestment remains an empirical question. Whatever the answer to
this question, our ￿ndings imply that if discriminatory fees were to result in overinvestment,
this would more likely stem from strategic investment incentives than from purely revenue
driven incentives related to discriminatory fees.5
The policy implications of these ￿ndings are clear. First, the focus of policy makers in
Europe and the U.S. should not only be on surcharges, but also, and perhaps even more, on
foreign fees. Second, encouraging rather than limiting coordination among banks in terms
of ATM investment may be socially more bene￿cial.
This paper contributes to the growing literature on ATMs, of which most has been
motivated by the introduction of surcharges in the U.S. In a recent contribution to the
substantial body of theoretical literature on ATMs, Donze and Dubec (2009) provide a model
in which ATM pricing and investment are endogenous, and consumers choose their bank as
well as at which ATM to withdraw cash given locations and fees in the market. They ￿nd
that increased ATM investment as a reaction to discriminatory fees may actually improve
consumer welfare, while making banks worse o⁄.6 Empirical work that considers the welfare
e⁄ect of discriminatory fees is rather scarce. Ishii (2005) and Knittel and Stango (2008) assess
the welfare e⁄ect of surcharges using data on banks￿market shares in the deposit market.
Knittel and Stango (2008) conclude that the increase in ATM investment that followed the
widespread introduction of surcharging in 1996 sometimes completely o⁄sets the welfare
reduction generated by partial incompatibility. In a more structural paper, Ishii (2005)
￿nds evidence that banks use ATMs strategically and that this strategic incentive causes
overinvestment in ATMs.7 However, multiple equilibria prevent her from providing explicit
5For a test of the magnitude of the strategic incentive relative to the stand-alone motive in the setting of
surcharge levels, see Knittel and Stango (2007).
6Earlier work on discriminatory fees and ATM investment can be found in Bernhardt and Massoud (2005)
and Chioveanu et al. (2009). For a survey of the theoretical literature on ATMs, see e.g. McAndrews (2003).
7Other empirical contributions on the e⁄ects of greater incompatibility on ATM investment include Snell-
3predictions regarding equilibrium ATM investment after a surcharge ban. In addition, both
studies do not explicitly account for the welfare e⁄ects in the market for cash withdrawals
and the importance of the location of ATMs in this context. Gowrisankaran and Krainer
(2007) use consumer and ATM locations in order to identify the disutility from travel distance
and ATM pricing from a structural entry model. Important limitations of their approach to
assess the e⁄ect of the removal of a surcharge ban are the inability of the model to adequately
deal with discriminatory fees and the fact that each ￿rm is limited to owning a single ATM.
Our paper is most similar to theirs, but by using ATM-level demand data our spatial model
is able to deal with fee introductions that are actually discriminatory. In addition, we
allow for banks choosing a network of ATMs and for potential variable cost savings from
ATM transactions as compared to branch cash withdrawals.8 This is similar as in Ferrari,
Verboven and Degryse (2009) who start from the same setting in which banks coordinate
their investment decisions and retail fees for cash withdrawals are absent. Although their
simultaneous model of demand and entry allows to assess the e¢ ciency of the ATM network
and policy measures to improve social welfare, it lacks the spatial characteristics needed to
answer questions related to discriminatory fees and changes in the degree of coordination
between banks.
From a methodological perspective the paper relates to the literature of both discrete
choice demand estimation and empirical entry models. Our demand model for cash with-
drawals is in the spirit of the work of Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995)
and more speci￿cally of the recent spatial models of discrete choice; see e.g. Ishii (2005),
Thomadsen (2005, 2007), Davis (2006) and Manuszak and Moul (2008b). Our ATM invest-
ment model builds on the literature of empirical entry as initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss
(1990, 1991) and Berry (1992) and is one of coordinated entry, whereas usually models of
free entry are considered. For the estimation of the investment part of the model, we use
Pakes et al.￿ s (2006) moment inequalities method, which provides a more general alternative
to the incomplete information entry models with endogenous location choice, as developed
by Seim (2006).9
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we intuitively discuss the
main features of our model. Section 3 presents the data set and the empirical implementation
of our spatial model of ATM cash withdrawal demand and ATM investment. In Sections 4 and
5 respectively we discuss the empirical results and our counterfactuals. Section 6 concludes.
man (2006) and Hannan and Borzekowski (2007).
8For a theoretical paper that considers ATM fees while allowing for variable cost savings from ATM use,
see Croft and Spencer (2003).
9For an application similar to ours but in a product assortment choice setting and using Seim￿ s (2006)
methodology, see Draganska, Mazzeo and Seim (2009b).
42 The model
2.1 Overview
In the model that we consider, consumers have the choice between branches of their own
bank or ATMs from a shared ATM network (either owned by the consumers￿own bank or
by a rival bank) for their cash withdrawals. Banks either coordinate ATM investment or
non-cooperatively invest in ATMs. The banks￿incentives to invest in ATMs range from
the traditional variable cost saving incentive under coordination, to more revenue-driven
incentives in the presence of discriminatory fees.
More formally, consider a market m in which consumers a¢ liated to bank i make a total
number of cash withdrawals Qi
m. In particular, bank i consumers can withdraw cash at
bank i￿ s branches (Qi
B), and at ATMs deployed by bank i (Q
i;i
A) or its rival banks r (Q
i;r
A ).
There is a constant variable cost per ATM cash withdrawal of cA, and a constant variable
cost per branch cash withdrawal of cB > cA. The ￿xed cost of an ATM at branch j is Fj.
When a consumer a¢ liated to bank i withdraws cash at one of the rival banks￿ATMs, bank
i receives a foreign fee fi from its customer, and pays the interchange fee a to the rival bank
that owns the ATM. In the case of a bank r consumer making a cash withdrawal at one of
bank i￿ s ATMs (Q
r;i
A ), bank i receives a surcharge pi from the rival bank￿ s customer, and the
interchange fee a from the rival bank to which the consumer is a¢ liated. Denoting the set
of bank i￿ s branches with an ATM (or brie￿ y, bank i￿ s ATM network) in market m by Ai
m,
bank i￿ s pro￿ts are:
￿
i(Am;p;f) = ￿
i
0m(Am;p;f) ￿ cBQ
i
B(Am;p;f) ￿ cAQ
i;i
A(Am;p;f) +
￿
f
i ￿ a
￿
Q
i;r
A (Am;p;f)
+
￿
p
i + a ￿ cA
￿
Q
r;i
A (Am;p;f) ￿
X
j2Ai
m
Fj, (1)
where Am ￿ (Ai
m;Ar
m ) is the set of branches with an ATM (or brie￿ y, ATM network) in
market m, composed of the ATM networks of the respective banks, and f ￿ (fi;fr) respec-
tively p ￿ (pi;pr) contain the foreign fee respectively surcharge levels set by the di⁄erent
banks. The remaining terms are a stand-alone component ￿i
0m that consists of other bank
revenues such as margin income, and the total ￿xed cost of bank i￿ s ATM network
P
j2Ai
m Fj.
Using the fact that
P
i
￿
Q
i;r
A ￿ Q
r;i
A
￿
= 0, the banks￿joint pro￿ts in the market ￿ =
P
i ￿i
equal:
5￿(Am;p;f) = ￿0m(Am;p;f) ￿ cBQB(Am;p;f) ￿ cAQA(Am;p;f)
+
X
i
￿
f
iQ
i;r
A (Am;p;f) + p
iQ
r;i
A (Am;p;f)
￿
￿
X
j2Am
Fj, (2)
with ￿0m =
P
i ￿i
0m the banks￿total stand-alone pro￿ts in the market, and QB =
P
i Qi
B
respectively QA =
P
i
￿
Q
i;i
A + Q
i;r
A + Q
r;i
A
￿
the total number of branch respectively ATM cash
withdrawals in the market. That is, on each branch respectively ATM transaction the banks
incur the associated variable cost, and foreign fee respectively surcharge revenues are earned
on foreign ATM transactions. Finally, note that banks￿joint pro￿ts do not depend on the
interchange fee a, as this is a transfer between the di⁄erent banks when one of the consumers
makes a foreign cash withdrawal.
In the remainder of this section, we will provide intuition on the incentives and trade-o⁄s
that the banks face when deciding on ATM investment under di⁄erent coordination and
pricing regimes. In particular, we will show that (i) coordination in ATM investment with
zero fees involves a simple trade o⁄between increased variable cost savings and the ￿xed cost
of an additional ATM; (ii) while the traditional variable cost saving incentive is lower when
banks non-cooperatively invest in ATMs, this may be compensated for by revenue driven
investment incentives; and (iii) when comparing to the case with zero retail fees, foreign fee
introductions will result in an opposite direction for the incentive to invest in ATMs as do
surcharge introductions.
2.2 Coordination
In the benchmark case, banks coordinate their ATM investment decisions and retail fees for
cash withdrawals are absent, as was the case in many European countries. In particular, a
commonly owned network operator decides at which of the branches in the market to deploy
an ATM, i.e. on Am, in order to maximize the banks￿expected joint pro￿ts. As banks do
not charge retail fees for cash withdrawals at neither ATMs nor branches, the banks￿joint
pro￿ts in the market as given by equation (2) reduce to:
￿(Am) = ￿0m(Am) ￿ cBQB(Am) ￿ cAQA(Am) ￿
X
j2Am
Fj, (3)
i.e. ￿(Am) = ￿(Am;0;0). This is simply the stand-alone pro￿t component minus the total
variable costs from ATM and branch cash withdrawals, and the ￿xed cost of all shared ATMs
in the market. To illustrate the banks￿incentive to invest in a shared ATM network in the
absence of retail fees for cash withdrawals, let us consider the marginal joint pro￿t of adding
6an ATM at branch j. Denote the network of shared ATMs without an ATM at branch j by
Amnj. Assuming that the total number of cash withdrawals in the market Qm =
P
i Qi
m is
inelastic with respect to ATM availability10 and using the fact that Qm = QA(Am)+QB(Am),
the banks￿marginal joint pro￿ts from deploying an ATM at branch j are11
￿(Am) ￿ ￿(Amnj) = (cB ￿ cA)(QA(Am) ￿ QA(Amnj)) ￿ Fj. (4)
Increasing the number of ATMs in Am induces consumers to switch from high variable cost
branch cash withdrawals QB to low variable cost ATM cash withdrawals QA. These variable
cost savings are balanced against the ￿xed cost of installing the ATM.
Based on his information set Im, the network operator chooses the network of shared
ATMs Am that maximizes the banks￿expected joint pro￿ts in the market. Denote the set of
all potential alternative networks as Aa
m. The network of shared ATMs A￿
m can be considered
to be optimal if
E[￿(A
￿
m) ￿ ￿(A
0
m)jIm] ￿ 0 8A
0
m 2 A
a
m. (5)
That is, the banks￿expected joint pro￿ts when the shared ATM network is A￿
m should be at
least as high as expected joint pro￿ts for any alternative network A0
m 2 Aa
m. This model of
coordinated investment in the ATM network in the absence of retail fees for cash withdrawals
will form the basis of our econometric analysis.
2.3 Competition
As a ￿rst counterfactual, we consider banks non-cooperatively investing in ATMs, both
without and with discriminatory fees. When making its ATM investment decision under
competition, each bank i will select the ATM network Ai
m that maximizes its expected pro￿ts,
taking as given the rival banks￿(optimal) investment decisions Ar
m. Under competition, the
banks￿incentives for ATM investment and pricing can be inferred from equation (1). We
￿rst discuss non-cooperative ATM investment for a given level of discriminatory fees, then
we present the banks￿incentives when deciding on the level of discriminatory fees.
10Using data on the average value per cash withdrawal, Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009) show that
this may not be an unreasonable assumption.
11In addition, we assume that the stand-alone component ￿0m is independent of the ATM network Am,
implying that increasing ATM availability does not increase the aggregate demand for retail banking services.
This is not unrealistic in our setting since most consumers already have at least one bank account and since
the shared ATMs are mainly used for cash withdrawals and not for other pro￿t-enhancing services. See
Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009) for a more elaborate discussion.
7ATM investment First, there is the traditional variable cost saving incentive; increas-
ing the ATM network may shift consumers from high variable cost branch transactions to
low variable cost ATM transactions, resulting in a per transaction variable cost saving of
cB ￿cA for bank i. Given that the positive externalities of ATM investment on other banks￿
customers￿withdrawal behaviour (i.e. shifting from branches to ATMs) are no longer in-
ternalized under non-cooperative investment, the traditional variable cost saving incentive
will result in fewer ATMs than under coordination. Second, by investing in its own ATM
network bank i may induce its own customers to shift from foreign cash withdrawals to cash
withdrawals at the bank￿ s own ATMs, resulting in a per transaction revenue of a ￿ cA ￿ fi
for bank i. The sign of this investment incentive depends on the relative size of the inter-
change fee a, and the sum of the variable cost of an ATM transaction cA and the foreign
fee fi; for a ￿ cA ￿ fi > 0 there is an incentive to invest in additional ATMs, whereas the
opposite is true when a ￿ cA ￿ fi < 0. Third, by investing in its own ATM network bank
i may induce its rivals￿customers to make more cash withdrawals at bank i￿ s ATMs. This
generates a per transaction revenue of pi + a ￿ cA for bank i; for pi + a ￿ cA > 0 there is an
incentive to invest in additional ATMs, whereas the opposite is true when pi + a ￿ cA < 0.
Hence, although the traditional variable cost saving incentive is lower under non-cooperative
ATM investment than under coordination, this may be compensated for by revenue driven
investment incentives. In general, when comparing to the case with zero retail fees, foreign
fee introductions will result in an opposite direction for the incentive to invest in ATMs as
do surcharge introductions; a larger foreign fee reduces ATM investment incentives, whereas
a larger surcharge increases incentives to invest in ATMs. Finally, note that by deciding
on its own ATM network Ai
m, bank i exerts externalities on its rivals. In particular, when
bank i increases ATM investment and its own customers shift from foreign cash withdrawals
at bank r￿ s ATMs to cash withdrawals at bank i￿ s branches or ATMs, this results in a per
transaction revenue loss for bank r of pr + a ￿ cA. In addition, increased ATM investment
by bank i may induce a rival bank r￿ s customers to shift from bank r￿ s branches respectively
ATMs to bank i￿ s ATMs, resulting in a per transaction revenue for bank r of a ￿ cB ￿ fr
respectively a ￿ cA ￿ fr. The respective externalities may be negative or positive, and may
in turn a⁄ect banks r￿ s investment behaviour. For instance, when pr +a￿cA > 0, increased
ATM investment by bank i may result in particular ATMs owned by banks r no longer being
pro￿table. Hence, interactions in ATM investment incentives are present.
The level of discriminatory fees When deciding on the level of discriminatory fees,
the banks face the following incentives. For a given level of transactions by the bank￿ s own
customers at rival banks￿ATMs respectively rival banks￿customers at the bank￿ s own ATMs,
8a foreign fee fi respectively surcharge pi increases bank i￿ s revenues. On the other hand,
when the bank￿ s own customers shift to the bank￿ s own ATMs respectively branches to avoid
the foreign fee, this will result in a per transaction revenue of a ￿ cA respectively a ￿ cB for
bank i. That is, to the extent that cA > a and/or cB > a, the banks face a trade o⁄between
increased revenue and increased variable costs when deciding on the level of the foreign fee.
In addition, when the rival banks￿customers shift to their own banks￿ATMs or branches to
avoid bank i￿ s surcharge, this results in a per transaction revenue loss a ￿ cA; to the extent
that cA < a, the banks face a trade o⁄ between increased revenue and increased variable
costs when deciding on the level of the surcharge. In general, it follows that the banks￿ability
to increase revenues through discriminatory fees may be hampered by the consumers￿price
sensitivity. Finally, note that similar externalities as the one described for ATM investment
may arise from banks￿decisions on the level of discriminatory fees. For instance, when bank
i￿ s customers shift from foreign transactions at bank r￿ s ATMs to cash withdrawals at bank
i￿ s branches or ATMs to avoid a foreign fee fi, bank r loses a per transaction amount of
pr + a ￿ cA; this may make some of its ATMs unpro￿table when pr + a ￿ cA > 0.
2.4 First-best and strategic investment incentives
We ￿nally consider a ￿rst-best situation where a social planner decides on discriminatory fees
and ATM investment to maximize total welfare. Total welfare consists of the banks￿joint
pro￿ts, as given by equation (2), and consumer surplus. While the incentives faced when
maximizing joint pro￿ts are discussed in Section 2.2 above, the social planner faces additional
trade-o⁄s related to consumper surplus. In general, consumer surplus is expected to increase
in ATM availability and to decrease in the level of discriminatory fees. Comparing ATM
investment in the coordination and competition regime (without and with fees) to ATM
investment in the ￿rst-best, allows assessing whether there is under- or overinvestment in
the alternative regimes. This is an important policy question, as the general consensus in
the literature is that surcharges result in overinvestment in ATMs, see e.g. Bernhardt and
Massoud (2005) and Ishii (2005).
One limitation that we face in answering this question is that our institutional setup of
full compatibility between shared ATMs does not allow us to estimate the strategic incentives
for ATM investment that may arise in the presence of discriminatory fees.12 These strategic
incentives stem from the indirect network e⁄ect between ATMs and the deposit market
when ATMs are not fully compatible (that is, when discriminatory fees are charged); a
12Unlike incompatible ATMs, shared ATMs do not provide a strategic advantage in the deposit market
(Matutes and Padilla, 1994; Donze and Dubec, 2009).
9larger ATM network then yields a competitive advantage in the deposit market for the bank
that has deployed the ATM network. Although the importance of these indirect network
e⁄ects tends to reduce when depositors face a signi￿cant cost of switching banks and the
evidence on consumers￿switching behaviour due to surcharges is ambiguous, this argument
may not hold for new consumers who enter the market and value a bank￿ s ATM network.13
Therefore, ignoring banks￿strategic investment incentives in the presence of discriminatory
fees may result in an underestimation of the ATM investment incentives under competition.
On the other hand, the studies that ￿nd overinvestment due to discriminatory fees do
not su¢ ciently take into account the spatial nature of the market for cash withdrawals.
That is, these papers do not explicitly consider consumers￿withdrawal behaviour and the
importance of ATM locations in this respect. Given the potentially non-negligable e⁄ects of
ATM investment on consumer welfare in the withdrawal market, ignoring these welfare e⁄ects
may seriously bias the conclusion of the analysis. That is, the conclusion that discriminatory
fees result in overinvestment may be wrong. This paper therefore complements the existing
literature by providing a thorough analysis of the demand-side of the market in addition to
the banks￿investment decisions, while taking into account the spatial nature of the market.
This spatial model will be presented in the next section.
3 Empirical implementation
In this section we present a spatial model of ATM cash withdrawal demand and ATM
investment in a setting where banks coordinate their investment decisions and retail fees
for cash withdrawals are absent. We observe a cross-section of markets (m = 1:::M)
with a number of bank branches (j = 1:::Jm). For each branch we observe a number of
characteristics (such as bank a¢ liation and geographic location) as well as whether it has an
ATM, i.e. whether j 2 Am, where Am is the set of branches with an ATM (or brie￿ y, ATM
network) in market m. For each ATM we observe the number of cash withdrawals (QAj).
In addition, we observe a set of consumer locations (‘ = 1:::Lm), and for each of these
locations a number of demographic variables. Before developing the econometric model, we
discuss the main features of our data set.
13Evidence on switching costs in banking markets can be found in Sharpe (1997), Kiser (2002) and Kim,
Kliger and Vale (2003). The empirical results on the e⁄ects of surcharges on deposit market shares are
ambiguous; Prager (2001) and Hannan et al. (2003) ￿nd no evidence that larger banks are able to use
surcharges to successfully steal business from smaller banks, while Massoud, Saunders and Scholnick (2006)
provide evidence of consumer switching behaviour in order to avoid surcharges. Ishii (2005) ￿nds that
surcharges increase a bank￿ s market share.
103.1 The data
We study ATM investment and cash withdrawal demand in Belgium in 1994. As discussed in
the introduction, the Belgian shared ATM network with a commonly owned network operator
coordinating ATM investment and zero retail fees for cash withdrawals was similar to that in
many other European countries.14 The year 1994 is well-suited for studying ATM investment
and demand in Belgium, as it represents a mature long-term situation for the shared ATM
network. In addition, in 1994 consumers still made only limited use of electronic payment
services and of incompatible private ATMs, installed within the banks￿own branches (see
Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse, 2009).
Our data set consists of three main components. The ￿rst set of data were provided
to us by the ATM network operator and comprises unique information on cash withdrawal
demand and location characteristics for all ATMs in Belgium in 1994. The second data source
is location information for all bank branches in Belgium in 1994. These data were obtained
from the Belgische Vereniging van Banken (B.V.B., the Belgian banking federation) and,
given that o⁄-premise installation of ATMs was not allowed until 2005, provide us with a set
of all potential ATM locations in 1994. Finally, we have available demographic information
at the block group level, which is more or less equivalent to the census block group level for
U.S. data. These detailed data on population (number of inhabitants), per capita income,
and the fraction of foreigners, young (under the age of 18) and elderly (over the age of 65)
were obtained from the National Institute of Statistics (N.I.S.), the Federal Government
Agency for Economics (Ecodata), and the the National Institute of Social Security (R.S.Z.).
We de￿ne a market￿ s geographic size in our analysis as a district. This de￿nition is
more or less comparable to the frequently-used metropolitan statistical area (MSA) market
de￿nition for the U.S. and typically consists of a big city and/or one or two regional cities,
a few smaller cities and a number of suburbs and rural towns. We believe this market
de￿nition is accurate in that banks typically consider a geographic area that is larger than
town-level in their decision on where to deploy an ATM, but potential interaction e⁄ects
between ATM locations are unlikely to be considered across the entire national territory.
Similarly, consumers can be expected to make withdrawals at ATMs outside their home-
town, e.g. in the town or city where they work or go shopping, but the geographic mobility
of a consumer for cash withdrawals cannot be expected to be too high either.15
14More details on the shared ATM network in Belgium can be found in the Appendix.
15This market de￿nition di⁄ers from the one used in Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009), who de￿ne
markets to be postal codes, which are part of administrative municipalities and typically consist of about
one or two traditional towns. As they model the distance to the nearest ATM rather than distances to each
ATM in the market, the assumption that banks and consumers decide on investment respectively usage at
11<Insert Table 1 about here>
This geographic market de￿nition results in a sample of 43 markets, for which Table 1
provides brief summary statistics. The number of branches respectively ATMs in the market
vary from 26 to 715 respectively 3 to 153 and there is substantial variation in the average
number of cash withdrawals per ATM across markets. The number of inhabitants per market
varies between approximately 40,000 and 970,000 and the average number of block groups
in the market is 433.
Summary statistics on the consumer characteristics across these block groups can be
found in Table 2. The demographic characteristics consist of population (number of inhab-
itants), per capita income, the fraction of foreigners, the fraction of young (under 18) and
elderly (over 65), and dummy variables indicating the regions Flanders (the Dutch-speaking
part of Belgium) respectively Wallonia (the French-speaking part of Belgium). The level of
geographic aggregation is quite detailed, as we have 18,614 block groups with an average
population of 551. Per capita income amounts to almost e12,000, the fraction of foreigners,
young and elderly is on average 0.08, 0.21 and 0.17. The dummy variables Flanders and
Wallonia indicate that nearly 60 percent of the population is living in Flanders, whereas
one third of the population is situated in Wallonia (the remainder is located in Brussels).
In terms of branch and ATM availability, the average (Euclidian) distance to the nearest
branch (not necessarily one of the consumer￿ s own bank) is on average about 0.9 km and the
average distance to the nearest ATM is about 2.2 km.
<Insert Table 2 about here>
Finally, Table 3 provides summary statistics on branch and ATM characteristics such as
the number of ATM cash withdrawals at a given branch, and a set of variables that may
a⁄ect this number of ATM withdrawals as well as the ￿xed cost of deploying an ATM at
the particular branch. These variables are summarized for both branches without and with
an ATM. The average number of cash withdrawals at an ATM is about 7,700 per month,
but there is large variation across ATMs. The bank dummies provide information on the
banks￿market share in terms of ATMs respectively branches without ATMs; the (large)
banks seem to deploy ATMs more or less proportional to their market shares in terms of
branches. The variable multiple is a dummy variable indicating the availability of multiple
ATMs at a given branch; banks only very rarely provide multiple ATMs at a given branch
(there are ten locations with two ATMs and one location with three ATMs). The variable
entry, which is a dummy variable indicating whether the ATM at a given branch had only
town-level is innocuous. This would not be the case in our current setting, as the distance to each ATM
matters and, in addition, variation in distances is expected to be of less importance within postal codes
(especially in rural towns and smaller cities).
12recently (i.e. during 1994) been deployed, shows that most ATMs have been installed before
January 1994; only 4 percent have entered the market during 1994. Finally, the average
distance to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre, as measured by the distance to the town￿ s or
city￿ s town hall, is 1.79 km for branches with an ATM and 2.38 km for branches without an
ATM. The average distance to the nearest city centre (minus the branch￿ s distance to the
own town￿ s or city￿ s centre) varies from about 2 to 25 km, depending on the size of the city.
<Insert Table 3 about here>
The data described in this section will be used to estimate a spatial model of ATM cash
withdrawal demand and ATM investment. This will allow us to identify demand (utility)
and cost parameters that can be used in the counterfactuals, that we present in Section 5.
3.2 The econometric model
In the remainder of this section we ￿rst consider the demand for ATM cash withdrawals in
more detail. Next, we discuss the most important features of the ATM investment model.
The model is estimated in two stages; ￿rst we estimate the demand model, then we feed the
results of this ￿rst stage into the joint pro￿t function and estimate the cost parameters of
the ATM investment model.
3.2.1 Demand
Speci￿cation We develop a spatial discrete choice demand model that describes the cash
withdrawal behaviour of the consumers in the market. In particular, in a given market m
we consider a set of consumer locations ‘ = 1:::Lm. Denote the population at location
‘ by S‘. We assume that consumers in ‘ are homogeneous and that each consumer in ‘
makes a number of cash withdrawals Q‘, so that the total number of cash withdrawals in
the market equals Qm =
P
‘ Q‘S‘. The consumer has the choice between either using one of
the ATMs at the banks￿branches j = 1:::Jm or to make a branch cash withdrawal at one
of the branches of the bank she is a¢ liated to.
A consumer at location ‘ has the following utilities from an ATM respectively branch
cash withdrawal at branch j:
uA‘j = vAj + ￿‘d‘j + "A‘j
uB‘j = vBj + ￿‘d‘j + "B‘j, (6)
with vAj and vBj the intrinsic utilities of making ATM and branch cash withdrawals at
branch j, d‘j the (Euclidean) distance between consumer location ‘ and branch j, and "A‘j
13and "B‘j are logit error terms. Note that the sensitivity to distance parameter ￿‘ is allowed
to di⁄er across consumers in di⁄erent locations ‘.
Denote branch j having an ATM by j 2 Am, where Am is the set of branches with
an ATM (or brie￿ y, ATM network) in market m. In addition, de￿ne Bi
m to be the set of
branches of bank i in market m; whereas ATMs can be used by consumers of all banks, a
bank i consumer can only withdraw cash from branches of her own bank, i.e. at branches
j 2 Bi
m. Assuming random utility maximization, the probability that a bank i consumer at
location ‘ makes an ATM cash withdrawal at branch j takes the following form:
s
i
A‘j =
exp(vAj + ￿‘d‘j)
P
b2Bi
m exp(vBb + ￿‘d‘b) +
P
k2Am exp(vAk + ￿‘d‘k)
if j 2 Am
= 0 otherwise. (7)
The probability that a bank i consumer at location ‘ makes a branch cash withdrawal at
branch j is:
s
i
B‘j =
exp(vBj + ￿‘d‘j)
P
b2Bi
m exp(vBb + ￿‘d‘b) +
P
k2Am exp(vAk + ￿‘d‘k)
if j 2 B
i
m
= 0 otherwise. (8)
These choice probabilities show that the probability of a consumer withdrawing cash at
a particular ATM depends on the ATM network Am as well as the branches Bi
m available to
that consumer. First, the more branches a consumer has available, the lower the probability
that she will use a particular ATM. Second, if more ATMs become available, the consumer
will make fewer branch cash withdrawals, resulting in variable cost savings. Third, the
probability that a consumer withdraws cash at one individual ATM decreases when more
ATMs become available (cannibalization). The degree to which ATM investment results in
consumers shifting from branches to ATMs as well as the amount of cannibalization will be
important determinants of the banks￿decisions on ATM investment.
Denoting the market share of bank i in market m by wi
m, the aggregate probabilities of
ATM and branch cash withdrawals at branch j by consumers at location ‘ equal16:
sA‘j(Am) =
X
i
w
i
ms
i
A‘j(Am;B
i
m)
sB‘j(Am) =
X
i
w
i
ms
i
B‘j(Am;B
i
m). (9)
16We assume that the banks￿market shares wi
m are independent of the number of ATMs, since the ATMs
are shared and unlike incompatible ATMs do not provide a strategic advantage (Matutes and Padilla, 1994;
Donze and Dubec, 2009).
14where the argument Am indicates the conditionality on the ATM network, as explained
above.
Finally, the total amount of ATM and branch cash withdrawals at branch j are obtained
as:
QAj(Am) =
X
‘
sA‘j(Am)Q‘S‘
QBj(Am) =
X
‘
sB‘j(Am)Q‘S‘, (10)
The total number of ATM respectively branch transactions in market m equal QA(Am) =
P
j QAj(Am) respectively QB(Am) =
P
j QBj(Am).
Estimation The number of ATM cash withdrawals at branch j is given by equations (7),
(9) and (10). As only di⁄erences in utility matter, we normalize indirect utilities by the
utility obtained from a branch withdrawal at the nearest branch of the bank to which the
consumer is a¢ liated. The probability of an ATM cash withdrawal at branch j by a bank i
consumer at location ‘ then becomes:
s
i
A‘j =
exp(vAj ￿ vBn + ￿‘(d‘j ￿ d‘n))
1 +
P
(b6=n)2Bi
m exp(vBb ￿ vBn + ￿‘(d‘b ￿ d‘n))
+
P
k2Am exp(vAk ￿ vBn + ￿‘(d‘k ￿ d‘n))
if j 2 Am
= 0 otherwise, (11)
where subscript n indicates the nearest branch of bank i to the bank i consumers at location
‘.
For estimation, we allow intrinsic utilities vAj and vBj to be a function of ATM and
branch characteristics Vj. In particular, we have
vAj = ￿A + Vj￿
vBj = ￿B + Vj￿, (12)
where ￿A, ￿B and ￿ are unknown parameters. The variables in Vj include bank ￿xed e⁄ects,
a dummy variable indicating the availability of multiple ATMs at branch j (to capture the
intrinsic attractiveness of a particular location), a dummy variable indicating whether branch
j respectively the ATM at branch j had only recently (i.e. during 1994) entered the market17,
17As we have no information on the timing of branch entry, we assume that all branches have entered the
market before 1994. That is, we set the dummy indicating recent entry equal to zero in the indirect utility
for branch cash withdrawals vBj.
15branch j￿ s distance to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre (as measured by the distance to the
town hall), and branch j￿ s distances to the nearest small, regional and large city (minus the
branch￿ s distance to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre). Note that due to normalization, we
only identify the di⁄erence between the constant terms in (12) ￿A ￿ ￿B.18
In addition, we allow the total number of cash withdrawals by a consumer to di⁄er across
consumer locations ‘:
Q‘ = X‘￿. (13)
The demographics vector X‘ includes a constant, per capita income, the fraction of
foreigners, the fraction of young (under 18) and elderly (over 65), and dummy variables
indicating the regions Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of Belgium) respectively Wallonia
(the French-speaking part of Belgium). As mentioned above, our inelastic total demand
assumption implies that Q‘ does not depend on ATM availability.
Finally, by interacting the distance between consumer location ‘ and branch j, d‘j, with
the demographics vector X‘ we allow the disutility of distance ￿‘ to di⁄er across consumers
in di⁄erent locations ‘. We also estimate a model where we allow for a nonlinear disutility
of distance by adding a squared term for distance in the demand speci￿cation.
The demand model is estimated conditional on the observed ATM network con￿guration
Am. For given values of the parameters (￿A ￿￿B;￿;￿;￿‘) we can insert the data on branch,
ATM and consumer location characteristics into equations (11), (12) and (13), and use equa-
tions (9) and (10) to obtain the predicted values for the number of ATM cash withdrawals
at branch j.19 Denote this predicted number of withdrawals by QAj(Am) and de￿ne the
demand model￿ s error term ￿j to be the di⁄erence between the log observed number of ATM
cash withdrawals at branch j and the log predicted number of ATM cash withdrawals at
branch j:
￿j = lnQAj ￿ lnQAj(Am).
The error term ￿j is the model￿ s prediction error and can be interpreted to stem from
measurement error. An alternative interpretation would be one of unobserved branch char-
acteristics. Demand models of this type typically incorporate unobserved product (in our
case ATM and branch) characteristics directly into the consumer utility (6) in order to in-
troduce an error term into the model. For computational reasons we assume in our empirical
18The separate constants ￿A and ￿B allow consumers to have a preference for either ATM or branch
transactions. In particular, our speci￿cication of the intrinsic utilities implies that a consumer￿ s preference
for an ATM compared to a branch transaction at branch j depends on the di⁄erence ￿A ￿ ￿B.
19We do not directly observe the market shares wi
m at the district market level. As a proxy we take the
market share according to the number of branches and suitably rescale so that the national market shares
according to our proxy equal the observed national market shares.
16setting that the observed branch and ATM characteristics capture most of the unobserved
variation in cash withdrawal volumes, and add the error term in a linear way.20 Assuming a
normal distribution for this error term, we estimate the model by maximum likelihood.
3.2.2 Investment
Speci￿cation The optimality condition for the expected pro￿t maximizing network of
ATMs A￿
m in equation (5) implies that a maximum likelihood approach to infer the unob-
served cost components in the pro￿t function would require assigning probabilities to each
potential con￿guration of the ATM networks in our cross-section of markets. Given the large
number of branches (i.e. potential ATM locations) in each market, this approach would be
infeasible.21 To circumvent this problem we use a ￿ exible methodology to obtain bound es-
timators from moment inequalities, as proposed by Pakes et al. (2006). By only considering
a subset of deviations from the optimal network As
m ￿ Aa
m in the optimality condition (5),
this method allows to provide bounds for the unobserved cost components in the pro￿t func-
tion. The intuition of the estimator is to infer bounds on the unobserved cost components
from the observed parts of the inequality condition for network optimality (5) for a subset
of deviations from the optimal network A0
m 2 As
m. If we substitute our functional form for
marginal joint pro￿ts (4) evaluated at A￿
m into the inequality condition (5), generalize A￿
mnj
to A0
m and divide by cB ￿ cA we get:
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with ￿QA(A￿
m;A0
m) = QA(A￿
m) ￿ QA(A0
m) and e Fj = Fj=(cB ￿ cA). Hence, the expected
pro￿t maximizing moment inequalities will provide us with bounds on the ￿xed cost of
an ATM at branch j relative to the variable cost saving of an ATM transaction. In our
20Our model can therefore be interpreted as a ￿rst-order approximation to a model with the error term
introduced directly into the indirect utility. The latter would require the use of a contraction mapping in
the spirit of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) to linearize the model in each iteration of the optimization
procedure and would substantially increase the computational burden, which is already high given the large
amount of consumer locations in the data. A linearization of the model would also be required if one were to
correct for the potential endogeneity of branch locations, see Davis (2006). We therefore impose the common
assumption in the spatial discrete choice demand literature that locations (distances) are exogenous; see e.g.
Ishii (2005), Thomadsen (2005, 2007) and Manuszak and Moul (2008b).
21Jia (2008) proposes a search for ￿xed points (lower and upper) to narrow down the number of con￿gu-
rations when entry decisions at a large number of potential locations is considered. This requires a mapping
function that should be increasing (entry in one location makes entry in another location more pro￿table).
For a decreasing mapping function (as in our case) the set of ￿xed points can be empty.
17empirical approach we allow this ratio of ￿xed cost over variable cost savings to depend on
location-speci￿c observables Wj and unobservable (to the econometrician) shocks v2 and v1;j:
e Fj = Wj￿ + v2 + v1;j. (15)
The variables that we include in Wj are a constant term and market population. The
latter proxies for for instance higher real estate prices in densely populated areas as well as
larger travel distances (e.g. for maintenance of ATMs) in large markets. The ￿rst shock v2
is assumed to be market-speci￿c and observed by the network operator.22 It follows that the
operator￿ s network decision is a⁄ected by the unobserved part of the cost ratio ￿2. Hence,
￿2 2 Im, where Im is the network operator￿ s information set. The unobserved cost ratio
factors in the second shock v1;j are assumed to be branch-speci￿c and unobserved to the
network operator. Therefore, the operator bases his ATM investment decision on expected
pro￿ts, taking E[v1;jjIm] = 0. That is, the network operator can make prediction errors in
his assessment of for instance the ￿xed cost of installing an ATM at a given branch.23
Estimation Given our assumption that v2 is market-speci￿c, we only require a set of
instruments zm such that zm 2 Im and E[v2jzm] = 0 to infer consistent bounds on the cost
ratio parameters from the observed part of the pro￿t deviations in (14). In particular, if
h(zm) is a positive-valued function of zm, we obtain the following inequality condition:
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Bounds on the investment cost parameters are obtained by considering a number of
deviations from the observed ATM network A￿ and for each deviation creating the sample
analogue of the condition in (16):
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22In other words, v2 is assumed to be the same across branches in market m. This assumption is the same
as in Ishii (2005).
23The motivation for the distinction between a market-speci￿c observed (by the network operator) error v2
and a branch-speci￿c unobserved error v1;j is the following. Pakes et al.￿ s (2006) moment inequalities method
requires a non-positive expectation of the unobservable part of the moment inequality after conditioning on
the agent￿ s decision and non-negative instruments (their Assumption 3). One of the assumptions to ful￿l this
requirement is that the inequalities to be formed are a linear function of the same unobservable regardless
of the realization of the network (our v2). To have branch-speci￿c ￿xed cost errors, we add a branch-speci￿c
error v1;j and assume it has mean zero conditional on the instruments.
18All parameter vectors ￿ that satisfy this set of inequalities are included in the feasible
set of parameters. If there exists no such ￿, we ￿nd the vector that minimizes the sum
of the absolute value of the amount by which each inequality is violated. The deviations
A0
m 2 As
m that we consider to obtain these bounds are in line with previous work in which the
decision on the number of ￿rms in the market rather than their speci￿c location is modelled
(Ishii, 2005; Smith and O￿ Gorman, 2008). In particular, an upper bound on the cost ratio is
obtained by removing one ATM from the network and computing the pro￿t di⁄erence in (16).
We do this for each ATM in the market, i.e. set A0
m = A￿
mnj for each j 2 A￿
m in turn, take the
average across these pro￿t di⁄erences in the market and interact the resulting average pro￿t
deviation with the set of instruments. Finally, we take for each of these interacted pro￿t
deviations the average across markets in order to construct the sample moment inequalities
(17). To obtain a lower bound on the cost ratio we do the opposite; for each location in the
market that does not yet have an ATM we add an ATM in turn and compute for each ATM
that has entered the market the pro￿t di⁄erence in (16) by setting A0
m = A￿
m [ j for each
j = 2 A￿
m in turn.24 Then take the average across pro￿t di⁄erences in the market, interact this
average with the instruments and take for each interacted pro￿t di⁄erence the average across
markets to construct (17). This approach results in two moment inequalities per instrument
zm.
The instruments used are a constant term and market population. The latter is in the
network operator￿ s information set and can be reasonably assumed to be independent of the
cost ratio disturbances v2 in the pro￿t inequalities. Following common practice (see e.g.
Ishii, 2005; Smith and O￿ Gorman, 2008; and Ho, 2009) we use simple transformations of this
variable to act as the actual instruments h(zm). In particular, we use an indicator function
that is equal to one if population exceeds its mean and another one that equals one if the
opposite is true.
4 Empirical results
The model is estimated in two stages; ￿rst we estimate the demand model, then we feed the
results of this ￿rst stage into the joint pro￿t function and estimate the cost parameters of
the investment model. In this section we discuss the parameter estimates from the demand
24Given the interpretation of the dummy variable indicating multiple ATMs at a given branch as being
a proxy for a location￿ s attractiveness (rather than the interpretation that increasing ATMs at a particular
branch is reducing queues and is actually increasing demand), we do not consider adding ATMs at branches
that already have an ATM. Note that for the same reason, we keep the value of this dummy variable ￿xed
when we remove ATMs from branches in order to determine the upper bound on the cost ratio.
19and investment model.
4.1 Demand
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation of the demand model. In a ￿rst speci￿cation,
we let the consumer￿ s indirect utility depend linearly on distance to the branch or ATM,
while in the second we add a squared term for distance. Distance from the consumer￿ s home
location to the branch or ATM seems to a⁄ect indirect utility in a signi￿cantly negative
way, as expected. The further away the branch or ATM where the cash withdrawal is made,
the lower utility. The second speci￿cation shows that the indirect utility is in fact a convex
function of distance; distance to the branch or ATM decreases utility, but in a decreasing
way. In a third speci￿cation we allow the distance parameter to be heterogeneous across
consumer locations. The third column in Table 4 shows that while consumers in areas with a
larger fraction of elderly (over 65) have a signi￿cantly lower disutility of distance, consumers
in areas with a larger fraction of young (under 18) and located in Flanders have a signi￿cantly
higher disutility of distance.
<Insert Table 4 about here>
Turning to the intrinsic utilities parameters, we ￿nd that bank ￿xed e⁄ects may partially
explain variation in ATM withdrawal volumes. In particular, ATM and branch withdrawals
at branches of larger banks generate signi￿cantly higher intrinsic utility than at branches
of a small bank (base group). This may indicate that some of the large banks￿branches
are located at more attractive locations and/or provide more convenient services than the
ones of small banks. In addition, it may be that large banks￿customers use branches for
transactions other than cash withdrawals more often than customers of smaller bank do. A
second ￿nding is that the dummy variable that captures the availability of multiple ATMs at
one branch is signi￿cantly positive. This is as expected, as this variable captures the intrinsic
attractiveness of a particular location. Recently deployed ATMs generate signi￿cantly less
cash withdrawals. This may indicate that consumers need some time to ￿nd out that an
ATM has entered at a particular branch and that the transactions volume of a new ATM
needs some time to mature. An alternative explanation may be of a more dynamic nature,
namely that banks ￿rst install ATMs at attractive locations and in a later stadium at less
attractive locations. We also aim to capture consumers￿shopping and commuting behaviour
by allowing the intrinsic utility of an ATM or branch withdrawal to di⁄er across the ATM￿ s
or branch￿ s location, both within the town or city as well as compared to the (relative)
location of nearby small, regional and large city centres. First, although the distance of the
ATM￿ s location to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre is only signi￿cant in one out of three
20speci￿cations, it has the expected negative sign; the further away from e.g. shops, the less
attractive the location tends to be. Second, the distance to the nearest large city centre is
signi￿cantly positive in two out of three speci￿cations. This may indicate that consumers
also make cash withdrawals in nearby large cities where they work or go shopping. The
further away such a large city, the more branches and ATMs are valued by the consumer.
Finally, note that the constant term of the intrinsic utility parameters ￿A ￿ ￿B is not well
identi￿ed from the constant term in ￿, the parameter vector entering total cash withdrawal
demand Q‘. We therefore ￿x the value of ￿A￿￿B such that the predicted value of total cash
withdrawal demand Q‘ for the representative consumer is about 2.25 The value of ￿A￿￿B for
which this is the case is -0.75, implying that the intrinsic utility of a branch cash withdrawal
is larger than for an ATM cash withdrawal.26 This may not be unreasonable, as consumers
can combine a branch visit with several other services that are not necessarily available at
shared ATMs.
This brings us to the parameter vector of the total number of cash withdrawals. Table 4
shows that whereas consumers from high income areas tend to make more cash withdrawals,
total cash withdrawal demand turns out to be signi￿cantly lower for consumers in areas with
a larger fraction of young (under 18) and located in Flanders and Wallonia (as compared to
Brussels). Given our assumed value for ￿A ￿ ￿B, predicted total cash withdrawal demand
(evaluated at sample means) is close to 2 in all three speci￿cations.
Before we move to the results of the investment part of the model, we provide a brief
assessment on how these parameter estimates, especially the one of distance, translate into
consumers￿withdrawal behaviour. The main implication of our spatial model is that the
location of ATMs rather than their mere number plays a crucial role in shifting consumers
from high variable cost branch cash withdrawals to low variable cost ATM cash withdrawals.
More speci￿cally, the closer a new ATM is to the consumers￿locations, the more it induces
consumers to switch from branches to ATMs. On the other hand, also the amount of canni-
balization is larger when the entering ATM is relatively closer to the consumers￿locations;
the more attractive the new location, the more people will shift from existing ATMs to the
25The estimate of 2 cash withdrawals per month is based on 2004 information at the national level on cash
withdrawals. Note that the government also used an estimate of 2 cash withdrawals per month for the design
of its universal service obligation proposal for the banks, that forced banks to o⁄er a minimum amount of
payment services, including cash withdrawals at branches or ATMs, at a low cost. Following the discrete
choice literature we also estimated a model in which we imposed a ￿xed number of total cash withdrawals
(Q‘ = 2 for all consumers in each location ‘); the results were qualitatively similar.
26Freely estimating the parameter ￿A ￿ ￿B resulted in a positive value for this parameter and in an
associated underprediction of total cash withdrawal demand (i.e. a lower constant term in ￿). The results
for the other parameters were very similar as in the restricted model.
21new one. The degree to which ATM investment results in consumers shifting from branches
to ATMs as well as the amount of cannibalization will be important determinants of the
banks￿decisions on ATM investment.
4.2 Investment
Table 5 shows the bound estimates for the ratio of monthly ￿xed cost over variable cost
savings.27 In a ￿rst speci￿cation, we simply estimate the ratio of ￿xed cost over variable
cost savings as a constant, implying that the ratio is the same for each branch. A natural
interpretation for this estimate is that it captures the average cost ratio across all branches
in the sample. In a second speci￿cation we allow the cost ratio to depend on population in
the market; the cost ratio is assumed to be the same for branches within a given market
but can di⁄er across markets. In the upper part of the table we show the estimated bounds
and 95 percent con￿dence intervals for the individual parameters.28 In the second part of the
table we show estimated bounds and 95 percent con￿dence intervals on the ratio of monthly
￿xed cost over variable cost savings; for the ￿rst speci￿cation in which we impose the cost
ratio to be a constant, the two parts of the table obviously coincide.
<Insert Table 5 about here>
Applying the inequality method as described in Section 3.2, we obtain a value for the
average ￿xed cost ratio across all locations in the range of e3,931 and e5,006 per month.
Adding market population does not seem to generate signi￿cant di⁄erences between branches
in di⁄ent markets; the e⁄ect of the variable appears to be not signi￿cantly di⁄erent from
zero. As a result, the estimated bounds on the cost ratio become somewhat wider; a lower
bound of e3,881 and an upper bound of e5,134. The 95 percent con￿dence intervals turn
out to be relatively tight for both speci￿cations.
Using external information that the average monthly ￿xed cost of an ATM is e2,300,
we infer from the estimated bounds that the variable cost saving of an ATM transaction is
situated in the interval [e0.45, e0.59]. These results are in line with the ￿ndings of Ferrari,
Verboven and Degryse (2009) and the references therein.
27We use the demand estimates from the ￿rst speci￿cation in Table 4 in order to obtain ￿QA(A￿;A0) in
the sample inequalities (17). For predicting the ATM cash withdrawal demand for a given ATM network,
the unobservables ￿j are set equal to their estimated values if the location has an ATM in our sample and
zero otherwise. The dummy indicating recent entry is set equal to zero for all observations.
28The 95 percent con￿dence intervals are constructed using simulation methods as described in Pakes et al.
(2006). The con￿dence intervals have not been adjusted to account for variance introduced by the estimated
demand parameters, see Ho (2009) for a brief discussion.
225 Counterfactuals
Discriminatory cash withdrawal fees can be levied by the consumer￿ s own bank (foreign
fees) and/or the bank owning the ATM (surcharges), and may a⁄ect consumer welfare in
two opposing ways. On the one hand, consumers are harmed as it is more costly to derive
bene￿ts from the rival banks￿ATMs. On the other hand, they may bene￿t if discriminatory
fees cause banks to increase investment in their ATM networks.
In this section we perform counterfactuals to assess the e⁄ects of changing the degree
of coordination in ATM investment between banks and the introduction of discriminatory
withdrawal fees. In particular, we let banks decide on discriminatory fees (foreign fees and/or
surcharges) and ATM investment, while taking into account the consumers￿reactions in
terms of withdrawal behaviour, and compare ATM investment and welfare under di⁄erent
coordination and pricing regimes.
5.1 Approach
We ￿rst predict ATM investment and welfare in the benchmark case, where banks coordinate
their ATM investment decisions and retail fees for cash withdrawals are absent. Then, as a
￿rst counterfactual, we consider banks non-cooperatively investing in ATMs, both without
and with discriminatory fees. We ￿nally consider a ￿rst-best situation where a social planner
decides on discriminatory fees and ATM investment to maximize total welfare.29
We proceed by dividing the eight banks in our sample in two networks. Whereas under
coordination the two networks choose ATM investment to maximize their joint pro￿ts, under
competition the two networks non-cooperatively decide on ATM investment. That is, under
competition the two networks decide on ATM investment, taking as given the optimal ATM
investment decision of the other network.30 Like before, a consumer can withdraw cash from
the branches of the bank she is a¢ liated to and from all ATMs in the market, regardless by
which of the two networks the ATM is provided. When discriminatory fees are introduced,
we assume that these are only charged when the consumer uses an ATM that is owned by a
bank in the rival network (i.e. the network of which the consumer￿ s bank is not a member).
That is, consumers never pay for ATM usage at banks within the same network as their own
29ATM cash withdrawal demand respectively the ￿xed cost ratio is predicted using the ￿rst speci￿cation
of Table 4 respectively 5.
30The two networks are selected on the basis of historical reasons. In particular, we replicate the two
competing networks that were present in the market in the eighties; the ￿rst one consists of banks 2, 4, 5 and
8 in our sample, the second one of the remaining banks. This approach allows considering non-cooperative
ATM investment, while simplifying issues of existence and uniqueness of pure strategy equilibria.
23bank. The same condition is imposed for the payment of interchange fees between banks;
banks only pay the interchange fee when its consumers use an ATM deployed by a bank of
the rival network.
Given the large number of potential ATM locations in our markets (about 180 on average)
and the amount of potential fees that we consider (a grid search on eleven possible values for
four fees31), considering all possible combinations of ATM networks and fee structures at our
district level market de￿nition is computationally infeasible. We therefore restrict consumers
to only make ATM transactions within the boundaries of the postal code (town or city) where
they reside. In this way markets become isolated and optimization of ATM networks and
fees can be considered at this lower geographic level, without having to consider network and
pricing decisions and the resulting changes in welfare in other postal codes. Given that even
in this case the number of potential ATM network and fee combinations becomes large very
fast, we restrict the counterfactual exercise to local markets with at most ￿ve branches.32 In
these 97 (out of 589) markets there are 379 branches (185 of network 1 and 194 of network 2)
and 32 ATMs (19 of network 1 and 13 of network 2) for a total population of about 650,000
and over 17 million cash withdrawals per year (predicted value based on equation (13)). The
population-weighted market share for the two networks in our sample of markets for the
counterfactuals are 40 percent respectively 60 percent; the member banks of network 2 have
a larger depositor base than the member banks of network 1.33
To perform our counterfactuals we also need some identi￿cation assumptions. The em-
pirical model identi￿es the cost ratio F=(cB ￿ cA). Based on our discussion in Section 4.2,
we assume the monthly ￿xed cost of an ATM to be e2;300. Evaluating the cost ratio
F=(cB ￿ cA) at the midpoint of the estimated interval in the ￿rst speci￿cation of Table 5
(4;469), we obtain an estimate for the variable cost saving cB￿cA =e0:51. Furthermore, we
31We consider foreign fees and surcharges for network 1 and network 2 from e0 up to e1 with intervals of
e0.10 and allow the networks to set asymmetric fees. Note that there may be incentives to set negative fees.
Banks may want to set e.g. a negative foreign fee to induce the own customers to shift to rival banks￿ATMs
to reduce transaction costs at own branches or ATMs, or to compensate the own customers for the surcharge
cost of a foreign transaction (in a setting with strategic interactions with the deposit market). We do not
consider negative fees, however, as this is deemed empirically less relevant (negative fees are not observed in
reality).
32In a market with ￿ve branches, we have 25=32 possible ATM networks. In combination with
(112)2=14,641 possible fee combinations this results in 468,512 cases for which market structure and welfare
in this market has to be determined. Given the number of branches per market in our sample with markets
up to ￿ve branches, we need to compute market structure and welfare in total about 26 million times.
33As a proxy for the networks￿market shares we take the market shares according to the number of
branches and use the rescaling that makes the national market shares according to our proxy equal the
observed national market shares (i.e. in the full sample of markets).
24assume that the variable cost of an ATM cash withdrawal cA =e0:10 and the interchange
fee a =e0:40.34 Finally, note that we only estimate the utility e⁄ect of distance. In order to
determine the consumers￿price elasticity in the absence of cash withdrawal fees we require a
value for the cost per unit of distance (km). This cost per unit of distance essentially deter-
mines the relative weight of price and distance in the consumers￿utility function, as well as
the weight of consumer surplus relative to producer surplus in the welfare function. As this
relative weight is of crucial importance we assume two di⁄erent values for the consumers￿
travel cost per km: e0:10 and e0:25. The higher value is a commonly used by compa-
nies and tax authorities to reimburse travel costs. The lower value roughly corresponds to
Gowrisankaran and Krainer￿ s (2007) estimate of ATM travel costs (using a di⁄erent model
and data). A high value for the cost per unit of distance implies a low relative (to distance)
price sensitivity of the consumers and a relatively higher weight of consumer surplus in the
welfare function.35
5.2 Counterfactual results
Tables 6 and 7 show the market structure and welfare under coordination in the absence
of discriminatory fees, under competition without and with discriminatory fees, and in the
￿rst-best; Table 6 assumes a low value for the consumers￿travel cost per km (e0.10), in
the next table a higher value for travel cost per km (e0.25) is assumed. The di⁄erent
welfare components in the ￿rst three rows (￿￿, ￿CS and ￿W) are expressed as the yearly
change (in e100,000) compared to the situation in the ￿rst column where banks coordinate
investment and discriminatory fees are absent; the market structure variables (N, Ni, fi, pi
and %markets) in the next twelve rows are in absolute terms. For the discriminatory fees
(fi and pi) we report the median fee in markets where the fee is not equal to zero and the
fraction of markets in which the fee is not equal to zero (in parentheses); %markets is the
fraction of markets for which at least one fee is not equal to zero.
<Insert Table 6 about here>
34In line with institutional information, we assume the interchange fee is essentially cost-based. That is,
we set the level of the interchange fee such that it covers the bank￿ s average cost of an ATM cash withdrawal
a = cA + F=QA. Taking cA =e0:10, F =e2;300 and evaluating QA at sample means (7,700) results in
a =e0:40. This value is also in line with interchange fees observed in the U.S., see e.g. Ishii (2005) and
Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2007).
35The price elasticity is obtained by multiplying and dividing the disutility of distance ￿d (where d is
distance in km) by the consumers￿cost per unit of distance k (in e/km); ￿d = (￿=k)(dk). As dk is the price
of travelling a distance d (in e), (￿=k) can be interpreted as a price elasticity. The approach of identifying
the consumers￿price elasticity in the absence of withdrawal fees on the basis of an estimate of the disutility
of distance is also followed by Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009).
255.2.1 Coordination
In the situation where the networks coordinate ATM investment and discriminatory fees
are absent (￿rst column of Tables 6 and 7) investment incentives stem from variable cost
savings from ATMs relative to branches. Increasing the number of ATMs induces consumers
to switch from high variable cost branch cash withdrawals to low variable cost ATM cash
withdrawals. As shown by equation (4) in Section 2.2, these variable cost savings are balanced
against the ￿xed cost of installing the ATM. This results in a total number of ATMs of 32, of
which the majority is provided by the network with the larger depositor base. Note that our
assumption on the di⁄erent values for the consumers￿price elasticity only a⁄ects the level of
consumer surplus (not shown in Tables Tables 6 and 7); for the remainder the two cases are
identical in the absence of fees.
<Insert Table 7 about here>
5.2.2 Competition
Zero retail fees In Section 2.3 we discussed that the comparison between competition and
coordination in the absence of discriminatory fees depends on two opposing e⁄ects. On the
one hand, the traditional variable cost saving incentive results in fewer ATMs than under
coordination, as the networks no longer internalize the positive externalities of ATM invest-
ment on the other network￿ s customers￿withdrawal behaviour (i.e. shifting from branches to
ATMs). That is, under competition the purpose of ATM investment in the absence of fees
is to induce only consumers a¢ liated to banks of the own network from high variable cost
branch withdrawals to low variable cost ATM withdrawals (cB ￿ cA =e0:51), rather than
also taking into account the behaviour of the rival network members￿customers, as is done
under coordination. On the other hand, by investing in its own ATM network, network i
may induce both its own customers and the rival network￿ s customers to shift from network
r￿ s ATMs to network i￿ s ATMs, resulting in a per transaction revenue of a ￿ cA =e0:30
for network i. Our simulation results in the second column of Table 6 respectively 7 show
that in the absence of fees, ATM availability is lower (-13 percent) under competition than
under coordination. That is, the decreased variable cost saving incentive dominates the in-
terchange fee revenue incentive. This results in both joint pro￿ts (-e12,000 per year) and
consumer welfare (between -e70,000 and -e174,000 per year, depending on the consumers￿
price elasticity) being lower under competition than under coordination. As the e⁄ect on
ATM availability is rather modest, the overall e⁄ect on welfare is limited, however.
26Discriminatory fees Charging discriminatory fees may allow the networks to increase
their pro￿ts through revenues on foreign transactions. As discussed in Section 2.3, the net-
works￿ability to charge fees to increase revenues depends on the consumers￿price sensitivity;
the more price sensitive are the consumers, the less will the networks be able to increase rev-
enues through discriminatory fees, as the consumers will more likely shift to their network￿ s
own ATMs or branches to avoid the fees on foreign transactions. The magnitude of the
discriminatory fees will therefore depend on the consumers￿price sensitivity. In addition, we
have shown in Section 2.3 that when comparing to the case with zero retail fees, foreign fee
introductions will result in an opposite direction for the incentive to invest in ATMs as do
surcharge introductions; a larger foreign fee reduces ATM investment incentives, whereas a
larger surcharge increases incentives to invest in ATMs.
Both theoretical predictions are con￿rmed by our simulation results. In particular, in the
case where consumers are relatively highly price sensitive (Table 6), fees are charged in only
one fourth of the markets and their magnitude is relatively low (up to e0.20). Furthermore,
foreign fees provide banks with fewer incentives to invest in ATMs (-32 percent), whereas
surcharges result in a small increase in ATM investment (+14 percent); given the observed fee
levels, the ATM investment incentive is a per transaction revenue of a￿cA￿fi=e0:10 (e0:20)
in the presence of foreign fees and pi +a￿cA =e0:40 (e0:50) in the presence of surcharges.
This incentive is smaller respectively larger than in the case without discriminatory fees
(a ￿ cA =e0:30). Given that the presence and level of discriminatory fees as well as the
e⁄ect on ATM availability is rather limited, the overall e⁄ects on welfare are rather small. In
the presence of foreign fees only, both banks (-e73,000 per year) and consumers (-e352,000
per year) tend to be worse o⁄ when comparing to the competition case without fees. In the
surcharges only regime, banks￿pro￿ts decrease with e15,000 per year, and consumers lose
e29,000 per year (that is, the negative fee e⁄ect outweighs the positive e⁄ect of increased
ATM availability). When both fees are allowed, the equilibrium ATM network is the same
as in the foreign fees only case, whereas fees are slightly higher and/or charged in more
markets. This results in somewhat larger losses for both banks and consumers (-e106,000
respectively -e389,000 per year) and a yearly total welfare decrease of about e495,000.
When the consumers are relatively insensitive to prices (Table 7), the foreign fees only
regime and the surcharges only regime become more distinct and the e⁄ect of discriminatory
fee introductions on total welfare increases. Whereas banks￿pro￿ts increase only slightly in
the foreign fees only case (+e55,000), higher foreign fees (up to e0.80) and a 36 percent
decrease in ATM availability (a￿cA ￿fi=￿e0:50 (e0:00)) result in consumers￿losses that
are much higher (-e1,083,000 per year), even though fees are only introduced in about one
fourth of the markets. Given the total amount of cash withdrawals in the market (about 17
27million), this consumer welfare loss is equivalent to a e0.06 increase of the cost of a cash
withdrawal or an increase of travel distance per cash withdrawal of about 0.25 km. In the
surcharges only case ATM availability almost triples as both networks have large investment
incentives (pi + a ￿ cA =e1:00 for both networks) to obtain surcharge revenues (fees up
to e0.70 in 60 percent of the markets). As this positive ATM availability e⁄ect outweighs
the negative fee e⁄ect, consumers have a yearly gain of about e2,165,000 (equivalent to a
e0.13 decrease in the consumers￿cost of a cash withdrawal or a 0.51 km decrease in travel
distance per cash withdrawal). As banks￿pro￿ts increase as well (+e476,000), surcharges
result in a substantial increase in total welfare compared to the competition case without
fees. In fact, in the surcharge only case, both banks and consumers are better o⁄ compared
to the benchmark case of coordinated ATM investment with zero fees as well. When both
fees are allowed, the results in terms of ATM investment seem to again be driven more by
the negative e⁄ect of foreign fees. Total ATM availability is only slightly lower (-4 percent)
than before the ban removal, but fees are much higher. Both e⁄ects result in large consumer
losses (about e801,000 per year) that outweigh the increase in banks￿joint pro￿ts of e36,000
per year.
To sum up, under competition foreign fees result in a reduction of ATM availability and
welfare. Surcharges may increase ATM availability, but the magnitude of the investment
incentive as well as its e⁄ect on welfare depends on consumers￿price sensitivity; the less price
sensitive consumers are, the more likely are surcharges to have positive ATM availability and
welfare e⁄ects.36
5.2.3 First-best and strategic investment incentives
We ￿nally consider a ￿rst-best situation where a social planner decides on discriminatory
fees and ATM investment to maximize total welfare. The results show that ATM availability
and total welfare are considerably higher in the ￿rst-best than in any of the regimes under
coordination and competition. In addition, when distance becomes more important relative
to prices and hence, the consumers￿weight in the welfare function increases, the number of
ATMs deployed by the social planner increases dramatically (from 151 up to 283, compared
to a number between 18 and 83 in the alternative coordination and pricing regimes) and
36We also performed simulations on coordinated ATM investment in the presence of fees. The main
￿ndings are that (i) under coordination foreign fees and surcharges result in the same market outcome (ii)
the e⁄ects on ATM availability and welfare tend to be larger (and more favourable) when consumers are
less price sensitive (iii) the decrease in total welfare when going from coordination to competition also holds
and is in fact exacerbated when discriminatory fees are introduced, except in the surcharges only case when
consumers are relatively insensitive to prices.
28the same holds for the positive e⁄ect on total welfare (from +e1,829,000 up to +e7,762,000
per year compared to the status quo coordination case without fees). As fees are generally
low (only up to e0.30) and charged in very few markets (up to 8 percent) in the ￿rst-best,
consumers gain on the expense of banks￿pro￿ts; the increase in consumer surplus from
increased ATM availability (from +e2,948,000 up to +e11,692,000 per year compared to
the benchmark coordination case without fees) largely outweighs the associated losses for the
banks (from -e1,119,000 to -e3,931,000 per year compared to the benchmark coordination
case without fees). The increase in consumer surplus when going to the ￿rst-best would
imply a cost saving per cash withdrawal between e0.17 and e0.69, which is equivalent to a
reduction of travel distance between 1.7 and 2.8 km per cash withdrawal.
Given that ATM availability is higher in the ￿rst-best than under all alternative regimes
that we considered, we can conclude that discriminatory fees (and surcharges in particular)
do not result in overinvestment in ATMs; in fact, we ￿nd a substantial degree of underinvest-
ment. This result con￿rms the ￿ndings of Gowrisankaran and Krainer (2007), but contrasts
the general consensus that surcharges result in overinvestment in ATMs, see e.g. Bernhardt
and Massoud (2005) and Ishii (2005).37
As discussed in Section 2.4, we ignore banks￿strategic investment incentives in the pres-
ence of discriminatory fees, which may result in an underestimation of the ATM investment
incentives under competition. On the other hand, we argue in Section 2.4 that the studies
that ￿nd overinvestment due to discriminatory fees do not explicitly consider consumers￿
withdrawal behaviour and the importance of ATM locations in this respect. Given the non-
negligable e⁄ects of ATM investment on consumer welfare in the withdrawal market, ignoring
these welfare e⁄ects may seriously bias the conclusion of the analysis. That is, the conclu-
sion that discriminatory fees result in overinvestment may be wrong. Hence, whether dis-
criminatory fees result in over- or underinvestment therefore remains an empirical question.
Whatever the answer to this question, our ￿ndings imply that if discriminatory fees were to
result in overinvestment, this would more likely stem from strategic investment incentives
than from purely revenue driven incentives related to discriminatory fees.
37The ￿nding of underinvestment in the absence of discriminatory fees con￿rms the results of Ferrari,
Verboven and Degryse (2009). From a policy perspective, they ￿nd that direct promotion of investment can
improve welfare, but the introduction of retail fees on cash withdrawals at branches would be more e⁄ective,
even if this does not encourage investment per se.
296 Concluding remarks
We have empirically examined the e⁄ects of changing the degree of coordination in ATM
investment between banks and the introduction of discriminatory withdrawal fees. Our main
￿ndings are as follows. First, foreign fees tend to reduce ATM availability and (consumer)
welfare, whereas surcharges positively a⁄ect ATM availability and the di⁄erent welfare com-
ponents when the consumers￿price elasticity is not too large. Second, an organization of
the ATM market that contains some degree of coordination between the banks may be de-
sirable from a welfare perspective. Finally, we shed new light on the discussion of potential
overinvestment due to discriminatory fees; ATM availability is always higher when a social
planner decides on discriminatory fees and ATM investment to maximize total welfare. This
implies that there is underinvestment in ATMs, even in the presence of discriminatory fees.
The policy implications of these ￿ndings are clear. First, the focus of policy makers in
Europe and the U.S. should not only be on surcharges, but also, and perhaps even more, on
foreign fees. Second, encouraging rather than limiting coordination among banks in terms
of ATM investment may be socially more bene￿cial.
Given the limitations of this and the other existing empirical papers on the welfare e⁄ects
of discriminatory fees (and more in general the optimal organisation of ATM markets), at
least two areas for future research can be identi￿ed. First, future work that aims to provide
a full welfare analysis of discriminatory fees by considering both the deposit market and the
cash withdrawal market, and in so doing adequately treating the e⁄ects on both consumers￿
and banks￿behaviour in all dimensions (withdrawal behaviour and bank choice respectively
ATM and deposit market pricing as well as ATM investment and coordination decisions) is
to be encouraged. Second, note that we, like other empirical studies on the welfare e⁄ects
of discriminatory fees, have kept the interchange fee that banks pay to each other when a
foreign cash withdrawal is made by their customers at a ￿xed level. An empirical assessment
of the interactions between the interchange fee and retail cash withdrawal fees, as well as its
e⁄ect on ATM investment therefore may be a fruitful open area for research as well.
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33Appendix: The shared ATM network in Belgium
In this Appendix we present the shared ATM network in Belgium. First, we discuss the
situation of the mid-nineties, which is the sample period of our empirical analysis. For this
part, we rely on Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009) and refer to the discussion in that
paper for more details. Next, we brie￿ y outline some recent developments in the Belgian
ATM market.
The mid-nineties In the late seventies Belgian banks created two competing ATM net-
works. Consumers could withdraw cash from any ATM of their own network, but had no
access to the competing network. The two networks were made compatible in 1987, enabling
all debit card holders to withdraw cash from ATMs of either network. In 1990, the two
networks merged and a network operator that was commonly by all the banks was created.
During 1990-2005, an ATM-committee within the network operator made the decisions on
the number and location of ATMs, which were always installed at one of the banks￿branches,
hence never ￿o⁄-premise￿(e.g. in shopping malls). Ferrari, Verboven and Degryse (2009)
discuss in more detail the working of the ATM committee and a number of mechanisms to
ensure cooperation between the banks. In addition, they show in their Appendix that many
European countries were similar in terms of common ownership and coordination of ATM
investment decisions.
As for retail fees for cash withdrawals, government regulation in Belgium has for a long
time completely prevented the banks from charging retail fees for any payment related ser-
vices, including cash withdrawals at branches or ATMs. Stepwise liberalizations in 1991
and 1993 enabled the banks to charge variable retail fees for cash withdrawal services, but in
practice, Belgian banks have generally charged zero variable retail fees until the late nineties,
both for branch cash withdrawal services to their own customers and for the shared ATM
cash withdrawal services to all debit card holders. We again refer to Ferrari, Verboven and
Degryse (2009) for a more detailed discussion of European countries in which no or low retail
fees for cash withdrawals were in place.
Recent developments Banks￿massive investment in private incompatible ATM networks
within their branches and a series of bank mergers by the end of the nineties that led to a
signi￿cant decrease in the number of bank branches triggered a debate on a perceived lack of
nation-wide coverage by shared ATM networks. In 2005 the debate resulted in a mandatory
sharing agreement, i.e. the banks were forced to make their private ATM networks accessible
34to rival banks￿customers as well.38 This mandatory sharing agreement resulted in a (larger)
single shared ATM network, as was the case in the mid-nineties.
However, there are some important di⁄erences. Most importantly, the banks can now
more freely decide on what level of fees to charge for which type of transactions. In addition,
they are now allowed to bilaterally decide on the level of the interchange fee. As a result,
investment no longer occurs in a coordinated way. This evolution, which is similar in other
European countries, may eventually move the Belgian and more in general the European
ATM market into the direction of a more competitive market stucture like in the U.S.
38Furthermore, the way for o⁄-premise installation of ATMs has been cleared.
35Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics on market characteristics
mean st.dev. min max
number of branches 180 158 26 715
number of ATMs 25 30 3 153
average withdrawals per ATM 7;231 993 4;984 9;193
number of consumers 238;638 217;064 41;093 964;276
number of block groups 433 249 101 1;023
Notes: The number of observations is 43. Sources: Banksys, B.V.B.,
N.I.S., Ecodata and R.S.Z.
36Table 2: Summary statistics on demographics at the block group level
mean st.dev. min max
population (S‘) 551 639 1 7;452
income 1:17 0:27 0 9:67
foreign 0:08 0:10 0 1
young 0:21 0:05 0 0:83
elderly 0:17 0:06 0 1
Flanders 0:58 0:49 0 1
Wallonia 0:33 0:47 0 1
distance to nearest branch 0:93 1:08 0 16:14
distance to nearest ATM 2:18 2:41 0 25:05
Notes: The number of observations is 18,614. The summary
statistics (except for population) are population-weighted. In-
come per capita is in e10,000s. Sources: Banksys, B.V.B.,
N.I.S., Ecodata and R.S.Z.
37Table 3: Summary statistics on branch and ATM characteristics
ATM no ATM
mean st.dev. mean st.dev.
ATM withdrawals (QAj) 7;731 3;040 0
small 0:09 0:29 0:17 0:38
bank 1 0:21 0:41 0:14 0:35
bank 2 0:07 0:25 0:08 0:28
bank 3 0:13 0:33 0:12 0:33
bank 4 0:05 0:21 0:14 0:34
bank 5 0:16 0:37 0:12 0:33
bank 6 0:20 0:40 0:13 0:34
bank 7 0:09 0:29 0:10 0:29
multiple 0:01 0:10 0
entry 0:04 0:20 0
distance to centre 1:79 1:45 2:38 1:98
distance to small city centre 5:47 5:21 5:25 4:85
distance to regional city centre 14:69 9:33 14:10 9:45
distance to large city centre 21:00 21:13 24:65 19:92
Notes: The number of observations is 1,094 respectively 6,657. Dis-
tances to small, regional and large city centres are expressed relative
to the distance to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre (i.e. the distance
to the own town￿ s or city￿ s centre is substracted). Sources: Banksys,
N.I.S., Ecodata and R.S.Z.
38Table 4: Demand model estimates
param st.error param st.error param st.error
disutility of distance (￿‘)
distance ￿2:89 (0:18) ￿4:01 (0:27) ￿0:38 (1:92)
distance2 0:68 (0:09)
distance￿income 0:14 (0:22)
distance￿foreign 0:96 (1:72)
distance￿young ￿11:81 (6:06)
distance￿elderly 7:64 (4:03)
distance￿Flanders ￿1:53 (0:56)
distance￿Wallonia 0:01 (0:43)
intrinsic utilities (￿A ￿ ￿B;￿)
constant ￿0:75 ￿0:75 ￿0:75
bank 1 0:26 (0:04) 0:26 (0:04) 0:24 (0:04)
bank 2 0:12 (0:05) 0:12 (0:05) 0:10 (0:05)
bank 3 0:26 (0:05) 0:26 (0:05) 0:24 (0:04)
bank 4 0:19 (0:07) 0:19 (0:07) 0:16 (0:06)
bank 5 0:31 (0:04) 0:31 (0:04) 0:30 (0:04)
bank 6 0:32 (0:04) 0:32 (0:04) 0:32 (0:04)
bank 7 0:27 (0:05) 0:27 (0:05) 0:26 (0:05)
multiple 0:54 (0:06) 0:54 (0:06) 0:52 (0:06)
entry ￿0:51 (0:04) ￿0:51 (0:04) ￿0:53 (0:04)
distance to centre ￿0:09 (0:14) ￿0:05 (0:13) ￿0:34 (0:12)
distance to small city centre 0:02 (0:06) 0:04 (0:06) ￿0:03 (0:05)
distance to regional city centre ￿0:07 (0:06) ￿0:06 (0:05) ￿0:06 (0:04)
distance to large city centre 0:13 (0:05) 0:11 (0:04) ￿0:01 (0:04)
39Table 4 (continued): Demand model estimates
param st.error param st.error param st.error
total cash withdrawals (￿)
constant 1:23 (0:44) 1:27 (0:44) 1:79 (0:49)
income 0:60 (0:09) 0:60 (0:09) 0:56 (0:10)
foreign ￿0:29 (0:35) ￿0:41 (0:36) ￿0:02 (0:42)
young ￿2:92 (1:35) ￿2:76 (1:33) ￿6:09 (1:58)
elderly ￿0:11 (0:87) ￿0:33 (0:85) ￿0:04 (0:96)
Flanders ￿0:62 (0:08) ￿0:65 (0:08) ￿0:53 (0:09)
Wallonia ￿0:42 (0:06) ￿0:45 (0:07) ￿0:28 (0:08)
￿ 0:37 (0:01) 0:36 (0:01) 0:36 (0:01)
R2 0:24 0:25 0:26
Notes: The number of observations is 1,094. For summary statistics
of the variables, see Tables 1, 2 and 3. The constant of the intrinsic
utilities parameters ￿A￿￿B is ￿xed at 0.75. Distances are in 10 km.
Per capita income is in e10,000s. Standard errors are in parentheses.
40Table 5: Bound estimates of the ratio of monthly ￿xed cost over variable cost savings
bounds on individual parameters
constant 3;931 5;006 3;475 5;633
inner CI [3;729; 5;177] [2;951; 6;427]
outer CI [3;590; 5;205] [2;892; 6;595]
population ￿3:87 3:48
inner CI [￿7:10; 5:73]
outer CI [￿7:10; 5:92]
bounds on cost ratio
cost ratio 3;931 5;006 3;881 5;134
inner CI [3;729; 5;177] [3;617; 5;443]
outer CI [3;590; 5;205] [3;617; 5;412]
Notes: We consider deviations based on 7,751 ob-
servations in 43 markets. For summary statistics of
the variables, see Tables 1, 2 and 3. Demand pre-
dictions are based on the ￿rst speci￿cation of Table
4; the unobservables are set equal to their estimated
values if the branch has an ATM in our sample and
zero otherwise. The variable entry is set equal to
zero for all observations. The instruments used are
a constant term and population. Population is ex-
pressed in 1,000s. 95 percent con￿dence intervals
are in parentheses.
41Table 6: Counterfactual results: high relative price sensitivity
coordination competition competition competition competition ￿rst-
no fees no fees foreign fees surcharges both fees best
￿￿ 0 ￿0:12 ￿0:85 ￿0:27 ￿1:18 ￿11:19
￿CS 0 ￿0:70 ￿4:22 ￿0:99 ￿4:59 29:48
￿W 0 ￿0:81 ￿5:07 ￿1:26 ￿5:76 18:29
N 32 28 19 32 19 151
N1 5 5 0 8 0 42
N2 27 23 19 24 19 109
f1 0 0 0:20 0 0:20 0
(0) (0) (0:24) (0) (0:25) (0)
f2 0 0 0:10 0 0:20 0
(0) (0) (0:11) (0) (0:11) (0)
p1 0 0 0 0:10 0 0
(0) (0) (0) (0:08) (0) (0)
p2 0 0 0 0:20 0:10 0
(0) (0) (0) (0:25) (0:20) (0)
%markets 0 0 0:24 0:25 0:25 0
Notes: The number of markets is 97. Travel costs per km is e0.10. We assume F =e2,300
(implying cB ￿ cA =e0.51), cA=e0.10 and an interchange fee a =e0.40. The di⁄erent welfare
components (￿￿, ￿CS and ￿W) in the ￿rst three rows are expressed as the yearly change (in
e100,000) compared to the situation in the ￿rst column where banks coordinate investment and
discriminatory fees are absent; the market structure variables (N, Ni, fi, pi and %markets)
in the next twelve rows are in absolute terms. For the discriminatory fees (fi and pi) we report
the median fee in markets where the fee is not equal to zero and the fraction of markets in which
the fee is not equal to zero (in parentheses); %markets is the fraction of markets for which at
least one fee is not equal to zero.
42Table 7: Counterfactual results: low relative price sensitivity
coordination competition competition competition competition ￿rst-
no fees no fees foreign fees surcharges both fees best
￿￿ 0 ￿0:12 0:43 4:64 0:24 ￿39:31
￿CS 0 ￿1:74 ￿12:57 19:91 ￿9:75 116:92
￿W 0 ￿1:86 ￿12:13 24:56 ￿9:51 77:62
N 32 28 18 83 27 283
N1 5 5 4 46 5 130
N2 27 23 14 37 22 153
f1 0 0 0:80 0 0:30 0:30
(0) (0) (0:24) (0) (0:56) (0:02)
f2 0 0 0:30 0 0:20 0:20
(0) (0) (0:11) (0) (0:53) (0:07)
p1 0 0 0 0:70 0:60 0:20
(0) (0) (0) (0:44) (0:05) (0:02)
p2 0 0 0 0:70 0:70 0:20
(0) (0) (0) (0:37) (0:23) (0:07)
%markets 0 0 0:24 0:60 0:60 0:08
Notes: The number of markets is 97. Travel costs per km is e0.25. We assume F=e2,300
(implying cB ￿ cA =e0.51), cA=e0.10 and an interchange fee a =e0.40. The di⁄erent welfare
components (￿￿, ￿CS and ￿W) in the ￿rst three rows are expressed as the yearly change (in
e100,000) compared to the situation in the ￿rst column where banks coordinate investment and
discriminatory fees are absent; the market structure variables (N, Ni, fi, pi and %markets)
in the next twelve rows are in absolute terms. For the discriminatory fees (fi and pi) we report
the median fee in markets where the fee is not equal to zero and the fraction of markets in which
the fee is not equal to zero (in parentheses); %markets is the fraction of markets for which at
least one fee is not equal to zero.
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